The task before us is to find a theoretical approach capable of answering, without contradiction, some of the questions posed in the preceding chapter concerning the nature of regionalism and regionalisation in East Asia and Japan's role in it. Broadly, we need to confront the theoretical terrain upon which neo-realism (as representative of the mainstream of current IPE theory) fears to tread. We need to come to a deeper understanding of the nature and sources of power in the global political economy. We need to integrate fully historical analysis so as to gain a clearer picture of how the Japanese 'state-society complex' came to exist in its present form. We need to integrate analytically the domestic and the international spheres and to combine an analysis of the global economic structure with the global security structure. In this chapter, I argue that the tools necessary to accomplish most, if not all, of this are to be found in a modified rendering of the historical materialist approach adopted by Cox.
The historical materialism of Robert Cox
As the limitations of neo-realism as a vehicle through which to understand the mechanism of world order establishment and maintenance have become clear, increasing numbers of IPE scholars have begun to look elsewhere for a solution to the structure-agency impasse that has confounded the mainstream. One such attempt, led in the first instance by Cox, has used the Frankfurt School's critique of mainstream sociology as a basis upon which to re-examine the work of the Italian political philosopher Antonio Gramsci (1891 Gramsci ( -1937 .
1 Although, as Cox himself freely admits, Gramsci had little of an explicit nature to say about international relations in general and about world order in particular, Cox has nevertheless employed several of the central concepts developed in Gramsci's Prison Notebooks as the building blocks for a revision of traditional international relations theory.
2
Cox famously starts from the understanding that 'theory is always for some one and for some purpose'.
3 All theories are constructed within the context of a particular social and political time and space and, as a consequence: 'there is no theory in itself, no theory independent of a concrete historical context'. 4 The problem of each theory is shaped by the issues and problems posed by the particular historical circumstances of the time. Thus, at a moment of profound technological and social change (for which the concept of 'globalisation' has become the dominant metaphor), and at a time when it is widely believed that a hegemonic power no longer holds sway over the international system, it is little wonder that Cox's work, and the work of others, has tended to focus on the changing nature of the world order itself.
5 Through a series of articles and papers, Cox in particular has placed himself in the vanguard of those seeking to highlight and question the negative effects of globalisation as they manifest themselves in, for example, environmental destruction, the ever-increasing marginalisation of the lower end of the labour force in both developed and developing countries and the exclusion of those unable to work. 6 In addition, he has recorded the related unilateralism of the US as its adjustment to the perceived loss of its hegemonic role has taken the form of a series of ill-advised and mostly cosmetic military adventures, as well as the imposition of 'hyperliberalism' on the world economy. In this, Cox is performing a function that arguably corresponds to Gramsci's concept of an organic intellectual in as much as he is seeking, through analytical discourse, to highlight the problems of (and to discover new strategies for opposition to) the dominance of the contemporary economic and social orthodoxy. In other words, he is attempting to contribute to the foundation of an alternative vision of the future, but one which is within the 'limits of the possible'; a minimal interpretation of this phrase being 'nonutopian', but which in Cox's usage is clearly a reference to the Braudelian notion of the limits imposed on social change by society itself.
8 By virtue of both his theoretical position and his overtly political stance, therefore, Cox distances himself from the self-proclaimed 'neutral' and 'value-free' position and role arrogated to themselves by neo-realist scholars.
As noted above, this 'critical turn' in Cox's theory of international relations has been profoundly influenced by the Frankfurt School's critique of mainstream sociology. 9 Its significance is evident in Cox's
